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Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is one of the most widely used tools to assess economic
decision-making. However, the research tradition on aging and the Iowa Gambling Task
(IGT) has been mainly focused on the overall performance of older adults in relation to
younger or clinical groups, remaining unclear whether older adults are capable of learning
along the task. We conducted a meta-analysis to examine older adults’ decision-making
on the IGT, to test the effects of aging on reversal learning (45 studies) and to provide
normative data on total and block net scores (55 studies). From the accumulated
empirical evidence, we found an average total net score of 7.55 (±25.9). We also
observed a significant reversal learning effect along the blocks of the IGT, indicating
that older adults inhibit the prepotent response toward immediately attractive options
associated with high losses, in favor of initially less attractive options associated with
long-run profit. During block 1, decisions of older adults led to a negative gambling net
score, reflecting the expected initial pattern of risk-taking. However, the shift toward more
safe options occurred between block 2 (small-to-medium effect size) and blocks 3, 4, 5
(medium-to-large effect size). These main findings highlight that older adults are able to
move from the initial uncertainty, when the possible outcomes are unknown, to decisions
based on risk, when the outcomes are learned and may be used to guide future adaptive
decision-making.
Keywords: Iowa Gambling Task, decision-making, risk, uncertainty, aging, older adults, neuropsychology
INTRODUCTION
Decision-making is a fundamental process in everyday life and subject to major changes over the
lifespan. According to a recent meta-analysis, early adolescents show a pattern of risk-seeking
behavior compared to mid-late adolescents, despite similar performances in decision-making
between children and adolescents (Defoe et al., 2015). Moreover, adolescents were found to be
more risk-seeking in tasks with immediate feedback compared to adults (Defoe et al., 2015).
A meta-analysis in healthy older adults was further conducted by Mata et al. (2011), while
differentiating participants’ decision-making performance in contexts of uncertainty and risk.
Uncertainty refers to circumstances in which the probabilities of the possible outcomes are
unknown, while in decisions under risk the outcomes and probabilities are given in advance
(Ellsberg, 1961; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Mata et al., 2011). Older adults seem to
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engage more often in disadvantageous decisions than younger
adults, but only under uncertainty (Mata et al., 2011). Under risk,
younger and older adults showed similar patterns of decision-
making (Mata et al., 2011). Interestingly, older adults engage
less in risky activities compared to younger adults, and are more
responsive to warnings about potential risks (Rolison et al., 2016).
The aging-related reduction in risk-taking seems to occur steeply
for financial and recreational decisions, but smoothly for ethical
and health-related decisions (Rolison et al., 2013). It seems that,
under risk, older adults respond to threat levels with increased
cautiousness (Rolison et al., 2013, 2016), but the threat level may
be difficult to identify without previous information, as occurs in
decision-making under uncertainty (Mata et al., 2011).
The processes and mechanisms that may explain the
abovementioned age differences in decisions under risk and
uncertainty are still poorly understood. The Iowa Gambling Task
(IGT) (Bechara et al., 1994) may advance our knowledge on the
differential patterns of performance under risk and uncertainty,
since the decisions along this task are expected to move from
uncertainty to risk (Brand et al., 2007).
In the IGT, participants are asked to choose a card from
four different decks to win as much money as possible.
While performing the task it is expected that participants
learn to discriminate advantageous (Decks C and D) from
disadvantageous decks (Decks A and B). However, learning
during the IGT requires more than just adjusting behavior
as a function of reliable feedback signaling long-term correct
and incorrect responses. Considering that high rewards in the
IGT are included in the disadvantageous decks, the prepotent
response is initially oriented to the decks that are also associated
with increased losses (Kovalchik and Allman, 2006). Adaptive
behavior requires the inhibition of the prepotent response,
as participants learn to forego the high monetary rewards
(immediately attractive options that are also associated with high
losses) in favor of the low tomoderatemonetary rewards (initially
less attractive options that are associated with reduced losses
and long-run profit). The shift in the prepotent response during
the learning process is conceptualized as the reversal learning
effect (Kovalchik and Allman, 2006). The difference between the
number of disadvantageous (Decks A and B) and advantageous
choices (Decks C and D) is considered a Gambling Index—
the total net score (Bechara et al., 1994)—that captures the
reversal learning effect and the adaptive course of action. Since
the implicit feedback in the first half of the task is considered a
close correlate of the uncertainty experienced in real-life (Bechara
et al., 1994; Verdejo-Garcia et al., 2006; Bechara, 2007; Brevers
et al., 2013), the reversal learning effect may unveil the moment
in which participants learn the advantageous strategy. Brand
et al. (2007) reported that only the last trials of IGT were
correlated with the performance under risk, supporting that
decks probabilities are learned along the task.
The starting point to conceptualize the shift from uncertainty
to risk is grounded on Damásio’s Somatic Marker Hypothesis
(Damasio, 1994). Damasio (1994) proposed that the affective
signals generated from the match between choices and associated
outcomes guide subsequent decisions, by biasing the decision
to the options associated with positive affective states. The
affective states are detected by the limbic system, particularly,
the amygdala. During the first trials, the limbic areas trigger the
affective values of gains and losses, and generate the automatic
somatic states (primary inducers) (Bechara et al., 2003; Bechara
and Damasio, 2005). Interestingly, levels of uncertainty are
positively associated with amygdala activation, suggesting that
this structure is recruited to detect relevant information when the
probabilities are unknown (Hsu et al., 2005).
An affective executive system—the hot executive functioning
(EF)—also accounts to detect monetary rewards and losses
under uncertainty. The hot EF is defined as the set of abilities
that regulate emotional awareness, impulsive reactions and goal
achievement, by integrating emotional, affective, and visceral
processes (Miyake et al., 2000; Zelazo and Müller, 2002; Séguin
et al., 2007; Brevers et al., 2013). The incentive saliency measured
under uncertainty is monitored by the hot executive functioning
to signal the best outcomes. Then, the information from primary
inducers is accommodated in the memory systems (Bechara
et al., 2003; Bechara and Damasio, 2005), and the hot EF
assists the cold EF in an integrated decision process (Zelazo
and Müller, 2002; Séguin et al., 2007; Brevers et al., 2013).
The cold EF is conceptualized as the cognitive determinant
of risk and gains, updating and maintaining the information
in working memory (Zelazo and Müller, 2002; Séguin et al.,
2007; Brevers et al., 2013). The hot and cold EF interplay is a
critical process to plan the necessary changes to future choices
(Zelazo and Müller, 2002; Brevers et al., 2013). The ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) will be critical to guide future adaptive
decision-making, mediating the secondary inducers—somatic
states generated by the recall of emotional events (Bechara et al.,
2000, 2003; Bechara and Damasio, 2005). The vmPFC activation
is associated with global IGT performance (Northoff et al., 2006;
Lawrence et al., 2009; Li et al., 2010) and, interestingly, with
performance in the final trials (Northoff et al., 2006), suggesting
that the vmPFC becomes less dependent on amygdala-driven
autonomic responses at the end of the task (Bechara et al., 2003).
Functional age-related changes in brain areas implicated in
decision-making [e.g., insula and anterior cingulate cortex (Good
et al., 2001), superior temporal sulcus (Sowell et al., 2003),
dorsal and ventral striatum (Raz et al., 2005; Walhovd et al.,
2005), prefrontal (West, 2000), and orbitofrontal cortex (Resnick
et al., 2007)] suggest that older adults exhibit less resources to
decide adaptively. EF, mainly dependent on prefrontal areas,
are particularly vulnerable to age-related cognitive decline (Best
et al., 2009). From the 7th decade of life, a detrimental effect is
found in several executive domains, such as response inhibition,
planning, and set shifting (Best et al., 2009), that are important
functions to reversal learning. Older adults tend to make more
perseverative errors, which indicate an inability to plan future
behavior in function of previous feedback and a failure to
inhibit an activated response pattern that as proven to be
disadvantageous.
A reversal learning effect in older players performing the IGT
is not detected when compared to younger players (Kovalchik
and Allman, 2006). Kovalchik and Allman (2006) proposed that
the lack of an initial preference in older adults compromises the
subsequent process of reversal learning. Decision-making and
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reversal learning seem, therefore, to become inoperative with
age, suggesting that a random selection strategy may be guiding
decision-making in elderly (Kovalchik and Allman, 2006).
Steingroever et al. (2013) also proposed that IGT performance
on healthy groups are characterized by slow learning processes,
and 100 trials are not sufficient to learn to discriminate the
safe over the risky options. The infrequent occurrence of losses
in decks B and D provides little information to learn that
deck B should be avoided. Moreover, with the exception of
the deck A, the remaining decks seem to have too similar
outcomes (Steingroever et al., 2013). Participants fail, therefore,
to distinguish bad from good decks, failing to progress from an
initial stage of exploration to a later stage of exploitation. The
limitations of the learning processes expected to occur during
the IGT may be particularly observed in older groups, since this
group have increased difficulty in discriminating negative from
positive outcomes in reinforcement learning tasks. The reduced
Feedback-Related Negativity (FRN) amplitude was found to be
similar after losses and gains, suggesting a decreased focus of
the monitoring system in classifying the outcomes according
to task-specific goals (Hämmerer et al., 2011). In fact, older
adults need more trials to identify the option more likely to
be rewarded, particularly when differences in reward likelihood
between choices are small (Hämmerer et al., 2011).
The revised literature documents that older adults show
detrimental changes in decision-making brain-related areas
that may compromise critical functions as EF, reversal and
reinforcement learning that are critical processes to decision-
making under uncertainty. However, and considering that
decisions under risk are similar (Mata et al., 2011) or even
improved compared to younger adults (Rolison et al., 2013,
2016), it remains unclear whether older adults are capable of
learning adaptive strategies and move from uncertainty toward
risk, that is, to integrate affective automatic responses in memory
and rational analytical systems that facilitate future adaptive
decision-making.
The current meta-analysis aims to address this gap in the
literature. The IGT includes both initial stages of exploration
(decisions under uncertainty) and later stages of exploitation
(decisions under risk) (Brand et al., 2007; Steingroever et al.,
2013), providing a comprehensive analysis of decision-making.
This allows extending Mata et al.’s (2011) results, which were
obtained with tasks assessing decision-making under risk and
under uncertainty independently. Also, Mata et al.’s (2011)
conclusions are retrieved from studies with a between-group
design (older vs. younger groups), from which we cannot infer
directly that older adults are not capable of learning.
For this purpose, we have meta-analyzed the performance
of older adults along the IGT blocks. The within-subject
design of our meta-analysis allow monitoring the participants’
performance along the task and to isolate the reversal learning
effect. The analysis of the shift from uncertainty to risk is of great
importance, since older adults’ difficulties in decision-making
appear to be restricted to uncertainty (Mata et al., 2011). We
hypothesize that the contrasting pattern of performance under
risk and uncertainty is explained by the lack of a reversal learning
effect in older adults (Kovalchik and Allman, 2006). The reversal
learning effect is required to perform adaptively in tasks under
uncertainty, and subsequently to move to a context of decision-
making under risk, in which the task contingencies have been
learned and may guide future adaptive decisions.
This hypothesis constitutes an innovative approach to the
IGT, since the results are typically analyzed in terms of the total
net score, disregarding the dynamics of learning that occurs
within the task. Finally, we also provide normative data on older
adults’ performance from the literature reviewed, namely a group
reference criterion to compare individual values of IGT total and
block net scores.
METHODS
The current meta-analysis followed the PRISMA Statement
guidelines for reporting systematic reviews and meta-analyses
(Moher et al., 2009).
Eligibility Criteria
The focus of the systematic search was studies that assessed
economic decision-making processes in older adults with the
IGT.
As inclusion criteria, the studies had to: (1) describe empirical
results; (2) report the Bechara et al.’s (1994) original version of the
IGT, in its manual or computerized versions; (3) include a sample
of healthy older adults (mean age ≥ to 55 years old and standard
deviation < to 10). Mean age criteria was based on Denburg’s
et al. (2005) cut off, and standard deviation criteria was defined
to avoid samples with a large interval of age.
Studies were excluded if: (4) none of the parameters of the
current review (total and block IGT net scores) were reported;
and (5) contained overlapping results.
To avoid publication bias, we considered unpublished
results, but none were retained after the application of
inclusion/exclusion criteria.
Study Selection
PubMed, EBSCOhost (Academic Search Complete,
PsycARTICLES, Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection),
and Web of Knowledge databases were used to identify papers
published since the first administration of IGT (Bechara et al.,
1994) (1994–September 2016).
The search expression, limited to titles and abstracts in
English, was (neurodegenerative OR Alzheimer OR Parkinson
OR Huntington OR dementia OR “mild cognitive impairment”
OR “frontotemporal dementia” OR ageing OR aging OR
“older adults” OR elderly) AND (“Iowa Gambling Task”).
Neurodegenerative disorders were included in the search
expression to identify papers using healthy adults as controls.
The selection of the studies included the following steps:
(1) combination of search results from different databases and
removal of duplicates; (2) assessment of inclusion criteria by two
independent raters (RP, CF), considering the abstract and full
text. Disagreements were resolved by consensus; (3) reference
lists were screened to identify additional relevant papers; (4)
authors were contacted to provide missing information; (5)
papers with missing or repeated data were excluded.
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Data Collection and Variables Extracted
During the assessment of inclusion criteria, the inter-rater
agreement Cohen’s kappa was used to compare the agreement
between the researchers, revealing an almost perfect agreement
(K = 0.95).
A standardized coding form was then developed to
systematically collect the main parameters of analysis. This
process was conducted by two independent researchers (RP and
ARG).
The extracted variables from the included studies were: final
sample size (n), gender (n females), age (mean and standard
deviation), years of education (mean and standard deviation),
task administration (computerized or manual), compensation
(none, fixed, proportional to the performance), total and blocks
net score (means and standard deviations).
Data Analysis
The quantitative results obtained from total and block net scores
were used to achieve our main goals.
To compute the normative data, the standard errors of the
mean extracted from the figures were first converted to standard
deviation by multiplying the standard error of the mean by the
square root of the sample size (Higgins and Green, 2011). Pooled
means (Mpooled) and pooled standard deviations (SDpooled)
were then calculated for each study. These pooled parameters
compose a single unit of analysis in which larger sample sizes
are proportionally represented by a greater effect on the overall
estimate, which improves the estimate precision and allows to
compare independent sample estimates.
To explore the effects of aging on reversal learning, we
computed the magnitude of the effect size from the difference
between block net scores, always in reference to the baseline
(block 1; B1). All analyses were conducted on Comprehensive
Meta-Analysis software (3.0; Biostat, U.S.A).
The meta-analytic methods were performed in accordance
to a within-subject design, as the data for the same participants
was entered for more than one condition, introducing
statistical dependence between the conditions. The work on
statistical methods for meta-analysis has been more focused on
independent sample sizes, whereas repeated measures received
more limited attention. The use of the same methods to calculate
independent and dependent effects is not recommended, as it
introduces significant estimate bias on within-subject designs
(Dunlap et al., 1996; Morris and DeShon, 2002). The calculation
of the within-subject effect size is dependent on the value of the
correlation between conditions, in addition to the means and
standard deviations of each condition. However, this value is
rarely provided in research reports. Indeed, none of the reviewed
studies reported this correlation, because the main interest
was to test group differences between the older group and the
younger or clinical groups. This issue has a critical relevance
to the current meta-analysis, as the magnitude of the effect size
depends on whether the correlations between the conditions
are smaller, larger, or equal to 0.5 (Morris and DeShon, 2002;
Ferreira-Santos, in press).
Given the issues outlined above, we opted to impute the
estimated correlation from the databases provided by the authors,
where the correlation values between all blocks were available
(seven samples). Correlations were pooled by using the weighted
average of Z-transformed coefficient coefficients, which was
then transformed back into a correlation coefficient via Fisher’s
Z inverse transformation (Silver and Dunlap, 1987). Because
the distribution of Z is approximately normal, this method
tends to be less biased than a simple arithmetic average, which
distribution becomes negatively skewed as the correlation is
larger than zero, particularly when including small samples
(Silver and Dunlap, 1987).
All the seven samples used to impute the correlation
coefficient revealed a low correlation between blocks: r =−0.107
to 0.219 (B2-B1); r = −0.039 to 0.379 (B3-B1); r = −0.155 to
0.198 (B4-B1); r = −0.024 to 0.277 (B5-B1). This resulted in
an imputed r value of 0.007 in B2-B1, of 0.086 in B3-B1, of
0.018 in B4-B1, and of 0.068 in B5-B1. For the seven samples
where the r value was available, the original value was maintained
in accordance to the performances between blocks. To assess
whether the variation in the correlation value would modify the
reported effect size, a sensitivity analysis using a range of plausible
correlations was conducted using moderated (0.50) and high
(0.80) correlations.
From the imputed correlation coefficients, we calculated the
Hedge’s g. This method prevents the overestimation of the
absolute value of the effect size parameter in studies with small
samples (Hedges, 1981), as frequently observed for Cohen’s d
(Cohen, 1988).
High scores on g indicate a positive net outcome (i.e., better
decisions on later decks when compared to the first deck),
while negative values are associated with negative outcomes and
disadvantageous behavior.
Heterogeneity Analysis
The heterogeneity analysis allows testing the consistency of
results across included studies. Statistical heterogeneity between
studies is considered inevitable, since methodological diversity
always occurs (Higgins and Green, 2011).
The variability between studies, that is, differences in effect
sizes that are caused by other factors than chance (sampling
error), was tested using the Q test (Cochran, 1954) and I2
(Higgins and Green, 2011). The significance of Q indicates
the presence of heterogeneity, while the I2 describes the
percentage of the variability in effect estimates that is due to
heterogeneity. Heterogeneity was present in the current meta-
analysis, suggesting that there is in fact more than one true
effect sizes at the population-level. Considering this, we may
not assume that individual effect sizes are measures of a single
population effect size (fixed-effects models). The alternative is
to incorporate the heterogeneity in the random-effect models,
where individual estimates are measures of a distribution of
possible population-level effect sizes (Field, 2001; Schmidt et al.,
2009; Higgins and Green, 2011). Providing a hyperparameter
of the population distribution, random-effect models allow us
to generalize the findings to the population, whereas inferences
based on fixed-effects models are restricted to the set of the
studies reviewed (Schmidt et al., 2009).
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Moderation Analysis
To further explore the factors that may be accounting to the
heterogeneity in results, we performed a moderation analysis.
Sample (proportion of females, age and years of education)
and task variables (administration and compensation) are
variables systematically identified in the literature and thought to
modulate the performance in the IGT (for a review see Fernie
and Tunney, 2006; Areias et al., 2013). However, the lack of
variability in task administration and compensation variables,
in addition to restricted information from several variables of
interest, conditioned the assessment of moderation effects of
these variables. Consequently, these variables were only used to
better characterize the studies in which the use of the normative
data may be particularly relevant.
Regarding the sample characteristics, age, years of education,
and percentage of females were considered as continuous
moderator variables. Independent meta-regressions across block
performance were conducted to test the learning effect, when
moderated by age, years of education, and the percentage of
females in the sample.
RESULTS
Study Inclusion
Detailed information on the study selection process is described
in the PRISMA Flow Diagram (Figure 1).
A total of 403 non-duplicated articles were found and 10
studies were added by cross-reference check.
In nine studies, it was not possible to assess inclusion
criteria. Authors were then contacted and asked to provide more
detailed information about the mean age and respective standard
deviation of the samples. Responses were not obtained for one
study (response rate= 88.9%) that was, therefore, excluded based
on inclusion criterion 3.
Twenty-one studies did not meet the inclusion criterion 1, 45
the inclusion criterion 2, and 279 studies the inclusion criterion 3.
For the 68 eligible papers, only three studies reported all
the required information to test our main hypothesis. For the
remaining studies, the authors were contacted. Data was no
longer available for five studies, but additional information was
provided for 25 studies. Of note, Caselli et al. (2011) kindly
sent to us a larger dataset of the published study. Lamar also
provided us with a more recent database from Visagan et al.’s
(2012) study. This latter paper only reports IGT performance
for a younger group, but the authors kindly authorized us to
report the performance of the healthy older adults collected at
the time. For the studies with no response or with no information
available, the total and block net scores were extracted from the
graphical illustrations using Engauge Digitizer software (V9.8,
https://markummitchell.github.io/engauge-digitizer/). However,
14 articles did not contain the required information and were
removed from the analysis (exclusion criterion 4).
The contact with the authors and the overlap of the outcome
measures also allowed us to identify repeated data across studies
(exclusion criterion 5). One study was removed.
Fifty-three articles (55 cells) were retained to calculate the
normative data for the IGT performance in aging. A subset of 44
studies (45 cells) was used to test the effect of aging on the reversal
learning effect. All the studies were published between 2002 and
20161.
Sample
The data from 1977 older adults (55% female) were used to
calculate normative data on the IGT performance (Table 1). The
mean age of the sample was 68.2 years and the mean years of
formal education was 13.2.
Task
Seventy-six percent of the studies used the computerized version
of the IGT. The remaining studies did not report the procedure
associated with task administration (manual vs. computerized),
which led to the exclusion of this parameter from the moderator
analysis.
None of the included studies rewarded participants based
on the IGT performances. Of the five studies reporting
payment to participants, only four compensated the participants.
Considering the few data points available, compensation was
removed from moderator analysis.
Normative Data
The samples from the included studies had an age range of 55–79
years old. Normative data for the total and blocks net scores is
presented at Table 1.
Reversal Learning Effect
Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration of the reversal
learning effect. There is a significant small-to-medium effect size
considering the difference of block 2 performance relative to
block 1, g = 0.48, 95% CI [0.37, 0.58], Z = 8.50, p < 0.001. Forest
plot of B2-B1 is displayed at Figure 3. The reduced consistency
between studies suggests that block 2 still corresponds to an
exploratory stage of learning, that is, the trials performed up
to this point were not sufficient to learn to discriminate task
contingencies.
From the block 3 onward, a gradual increase in a medium-
to-large effect size is found in relation to block 1: B3-B1, g =
0.70, 95% CI [0.56, 0.84], Z = 9.70, p < 0.001; B4-B1, g =
0.73, 95% CI [0.58, 0.89], Z = 9.17, p < 0.001; B5-B1, g = 0.74,
95% CI [0.58, 0.89], Z = 9.26, p < 0.001. Forest plot of B5-B1
comparison is displayed at Figure 4. The increase in effect size
magnitude suggests that, in later blocks, studies systematically
report that older adults learn to discriminate advantageous from
disadvantageous decks.
The remaining forest plots (B3-B1 and B4-B1) may be found
in Figures 5, 6 (Supplementary Information).
1Despite systematic search procedures, meta-analyses often evidence publication
bias since studies reporting significant differences and large effects, are more likely
to be published than studies that report non-significant differences (e.g., Dickersin,
2015). To assess the overestimation bias in the reported effect sizes we calculated
the Egger’s (1997) regression intercept for each block comparison. Egger’s intercept
was not significant in B2-B1 (B= 1.04, p= 0.172). However, a significant intercept
was found in B3-B1 (B= 2.97, p < 0.001), B4-B1 (B= 3.59, p < 0.001), and B5-B1
(B= 3.58, p < 0.001), suggesting the existence of publication bias.
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FIGURE 1 | PRISMA flow diagram.
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Sensitivity Analysis
The sensitivity analysis did not reveal major alterations in the
reported effect sizes using either a moderate 0.05 correlation
coefficient (B2-B1; g = 0.47, 95% CI [0.36, 0.58], Z = 8.43, p <
0.001; B3-B1, g = 0.72, 95% CI [0.60, 0.86], Z = 9.91, p < 0.001;
B4-B1, g = 0.77, 95% CI [0.61, 0.93], Z = 9.58, p < 0.001; B5-
B1, g = 0.77, 95% CI [0.61, 0.93], Z = 9.62, p < 0.001), or a
0.08 correlation coefficient (B2-B1, g = 0.46, 95% CI [0.35, 0.60],
Z = 8.36, p < 0.001; B3-B1, g = 0.71, 95% CI [0.57, 0.85], Z
= 10.0, p < 0.001; B4-B1, g = 0.78, 95% CI [0.63, 0.94], Z =
9.98, p < 0.001; B5-B1, g = 0.78, 95% CI [0.63, 0.94], Z = 10.0,
p < 0.001). These results indicate that variation in the actual
correlation value would not substantially modify the reported
effect sizes and the overall findings of the current meta-analysis.
Heterogeneity Analysis
Significant heterogeneity was found, suggesting variability
between studies and demonstrating the importance of accounting
for study-level moderators.
B2-B1,Q(44)= 89.4, p< 0.001, I
2= 50.8; B3-B1,Q(44)= 144.1,
p < 0.001, I2 = 69.5; B4-B1, Q(44) = 160.1, p < 0.001, I
2 = 72.5;
B5-B1, Q(44) = 89.4, p < 0.001, I
2 = 50.8.
Moderation Analysis
None of the moderators described below approached
significance, indicating that the heterogeneity between studies is
not explained by increased age, differences in years of education
or proportion of females.
B2-B1: age, b = 0.01, CI 95% [−0.01, 0.03], Z(44) = 0.82, p
= 0.410; years of education, b = −0.0002, CI 95% [−0.04, 0.04],
Z(35) =−0.11, p= 0.912; proportion of females, b= 0.46, CI 95%
[−0.27, 1.19], Z(35) = 1.22, p= 0.221.
B3-B1: age, b = −0.004, CI 95% [−0.03, 0.02], Z(44) = −0.28,
p = 0.777; years of education, b = 0.0038, CI 95% [−0.05, 0.05],
Z(35) = 0.15, p = 0.880; proportion of females, b = 0.37, CI 95%
[–0.60, 0.34], Z(35) = 0.75, p= 0.453.
B4-B1: age, b = −0.004, CI 95% [−0.04, 0.03], Z(44) = −0.26,
p= 0.795; years of education, b=−0.004, CI 95% [−0.06, 0.049],
Z(35) = −0.15, p = 0.882; proportion of females, b = 0.0007, CI
95% [−1.07, 1.07], Z(35) = 0.00, p= 0.999.
B5-B1: age, b = −0.005, CI 95% [−0.04, 0.03], Z(44) = −0.29,
p= 0.770; years of education, b=−0.004, CI 95% [−0.06, 0.05],
Z(35) = −0.16, p = 0.873; proportion of females, b = 0.0018, CI
95% [−1.06, 1.06], Z(35) = 0.00, p= 0.997.
DISCUSSION
The IGT is one of the most widely used tools to assess decision-
making. However, most of the research on IGT and aging has
been mainly focused on the performance comparison between
older adults and clinical or younger groups. Despite the evidence
that older adults make more disadvantageous decisions than
younger groups on the IGT (Mata et al., 2011), one question
remains unclear: do older adults learn to choose advantageously
along the task?
The trend to collapse the choices across blocks to create a
summary score—the total net score—restricts the understanding
FIGURE 2 | Mean values (and standard errors) of net outcomes (y-axis)
considering the performance of older adults across IGT blocks (x-axis).
of learning processes that may take place during the IGT. In fact,
and to our knowledge, this study is the first to consider within-
subject methods when meta-analyzing the IGT performance in
different blocks. This method is a relevant contribution to the
research field of decision-making in older-adults, as performance
in IGT may be ruled by two distinct types of decision-making—
under uncertainty and under risk—and only the first is found
to be impaired in older adults (Mata et al., 2011). Therefore, it
is critical to understand if older adults’ decisions remain ruled
by uncertainty or, in turn, older adults are capable to learn from
experience and move to decisions based on known outcomes.
During the first blocks, the decision-making on the IGT is
expected to be driven by affective cues. This is an exploratory
stage of learning, as participants have not yet deciphered the
contingencies of the decks, and decision-making is made under
uncertainty (Brand et al., 2007). Confirming the exploratory
process of learning, a negative block net score on block 1
stands out in the older group. Right after block 1, a significant
reversal learning effect was found. However, the effect size in
relation to the difference between block 2 and block 1 was only
small-to-medium in magnitude (g = 0.48), demonstrating that a
significant improvement in performances is not a robust finding
across studies.
From trial 50 onward, choices are expected to be more
adaptive and driven by the acquired knowledge (Bechara, 2007).
The decision is now expected to be made under risk, as the
contingencies of the task are expected to be learned (Brand et al.,
2007). The effect sizes from block 3 to block 5 became medium-
to-large in magnitude (g = 0.70 to 0.78), which is in line with
the literature defining the trial 50 as the starting point to develop
adaptive choices on the IGT (Bechara, 2007).
The main findings provide evidence that older adults exhibit
an advantageous pattern of performance during the IGT. The
robust reversal learning effect evidenced in block 3 suggests that
the shift from ambiguity to risk seems to occur in this block, and
importantly, around the trial proposed by Bechara and colleagues
(Bechara, 2007). The hypothesis that older adults, compared to
younger groups, tend to choose immediately attractive options
on IGT that lead to higher monetary losses along the task (Mata
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FIGURE 3 | Forest plot of older performance in the initial IGT block (B2-B1).
et al., 2011) does not necessarily mean that older adults are not
capable to learn under uncertainty. The within-subjects design
of our meta-analysis highlights that learning processes under
uncertainty are not entirely compromised with increased age.
Moreover, our analyses illustrate how collapsing the choices in
a total net score might hide the reversal learning effect across
the blocks, masking the older adults’ ability to learn under
uncertainty.
From our results, older adults seem to be able to use the
salient affective stimuli and then integrate these somatic markers
(Damasio, 1994) in memory and rational analytical systems,
albeit in a less effective way than younger adults (Frank andKong,
2008; Hämmerer et al., 2011; Mata et al., 2011).
The reviewed studies indicate that older adults show a positive
net outcome while performing the task, which means that they
finish the task with an adaptive pattern of decision-making,
by choosing the advantageous decks more frequently. Only 8
of the 43 studies reported a negative performance in older
adults. Despite the positive outcome evidenced by older adults,
it should be acknowledged that a net score of ≥10 is the cut-
off index that describe performances that are not within the
range of vmPFC patients (Bechara and Damasio, 2002; Bechara
et al., 2002). The total net normative value of older adults is
below 10 by Bechara’s criterion (Bechara et al., 2002), which
would suggest impaired performance and a “myopia for the
future” in older groups. The variance around the mean must
be taken, however, into account (±25.9), as well as individual
differences.
Direct evidence from the 8 studies reporting negative net
scores (Bakos et al., 2008; Wagner et al., 2009; Ottaviani
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FIGURE 4 | Forest plot of older performance in the final IGT block (B5-B1).
and Vandone, 2011; Bertoux et al., 2013; Auzou et al., 2014;
Evens et al., 2015; Schiebener and Brand, 2016) may help
to identify relevant individual differences implicated in IGT
performance, since the moderators systematically reported in
the literature failed to achieve significance in our meta-analysis.
This comprehensive analysis is limited, however, by the focus
of the included studies on group differences. The focus of
the majority of the studies reporting negative net outcomes is
redirected to variables that explain impaired performance in
clinical groups as opposed to a comprehensive interpretation of
the performance of healthy older groups. Nevertheless, Bakos
et al. (2008) observed that the oldest old group exhibited poor
decision-making in IGT compared to the younger elderly group,
despite similar performance in selective attention, short-term
memory, and working memory. This finding would suggest that
increasing age may compromise adaptive performance in IGT,
but our meta-regression showed that age did not moderate the
findings. In turn, Schiebener and Brand (2016) included an age
range of 18–86 years. Remarkably, age-related variance on IGT
performance occurred only in the last 60 trials and in a task
with explicit instructions, that is, when decisions are expected
to be conducted under risk (Schiebener and Brand, 2016).
In the first 40 trials—decision-making under uncertainty—
the association between increasing age and less advantageous
decision-making was small. This main finding is in line with the
theoretical background of the current meta-analysis, highlighting
that economic decision-making in later life shows specific
dynamics.
Under uncertainty, the amygdala is a critical brain area to
trigger affective cues and respond to primary inducers (Damasio,
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1994; Hsu et al., 2005) and, interestingly, age does not seem to
significantly affect this structure (Mather et al., 2004). This may
explain why older adults are capable of deciding advantageously
under uncertainty. The difficulty in achieving a performance
similar to the younger group, as previously documented in Mata
et al.’s (2011) meta-analysis, may be explained by a functional
deficit in cognitive functioning. Schiebener and Brand (2016)
reported that, after controlling for the effects of cognitive
abilities, no age-related variance in decision-making in the
IGT remained. This result suggests that age-related changes in
EF and reasoning may explain individual differences in IGT
performance.
The differences between older and younger adults may be
further explained by the difficulty in the older group to persecute
the option more likely to be rewarded when differences in reward
likelihood are small (Hämmerer et al., 2011). Steingroever et al.
(2013) argued that 3 of 4 decks seem to present too similar
outcomes. Reduced and similar FRN amplitude in the processing
of gains and losses in older adults was previously documented
(Hämmerer et al., 2011).
Age-related effects on risky decision-making extends beyond
cognition and is also linked to individual differences in
personality. Denburg et al. (2009) found that high levels of
trait neuroticism in older adults (i.e., proneness to experience
negative affective states such as fear, anxiety, sadness, guilt, and
anger) is associated with impaired decision-making performance.
Importantly, younger adults with high trait-anxiety (Suhr and
Tsanadis, 2007) and negative affect (Miu et al., 2008) also
show impaired decision-making under uncertainty, despite the
increased and potentially adaptive anticipatory somatic signals
associated with high trait-anxiety (Suhr and Tsanadis, 2007).
The main findings suggest that affect and personality are
critical mechanisms to extend our knowledge on older adults’
performance in the IGT and, therefore, studies should include
these variables.
From the empirical evidence accumulated along the years, the
normative total net score for older groups is of 7.55 (±25.9).
The lack of age moderation effects suggests that the proposed
normative score is representative of the 55–79 age range. The
calculation of normative scores, even limited to a statistical
criterion, constitute a group reference to compare individual
performances of IGT in healthy older adults. Future studies may
cluster impaired and unimpaired performances from Z scores.
The Z scores represent the number of standard deviations below
or above the mean considering the individual total net score.
Moreover, performance may be analyzed depending on whether
the overall score is significantly different from the normative
pooled mean, in a negative or positive direction, using the
binomial test (Siegel, 1956; Damasio, 1994; Denburg et al., 2005).
Under the assumption that a total net score of zero reflects
equal probability to choose advantageous and disadvantageous
decks, impaired performance is significantly different from zero
in a negative direction, while unimpaired performance differs
significantly in a positive direction (Denburg et al., 2005). The
participants whose total score is not statistically significant from
zero in either direction may be included in the borderline group
(Denburg et al., 2005).
In sum, our results contradict the assumption (Kovalchik
and Allman, 2006) that older adults engage in a random
selection strategy, since older adults tend to evidence a pattern of
advantageous decision-making. Furthermore, our meta-analysis
point that the performance within-study variability reported by
Steingroever et al. (2013) contrasts with a robust effect size
between-studies. Steingroever et al. (2013) proposed that 100
trials were not sufficient to learn to discriminate safe from risky
options and, subsequently, the switch behavior from exploration
to exploitation would not occur. From our data, older adults seem
to first explore the different decks, as evidenced in negative net
outcomes in block 1, and then exploit themost profitable options,
culminating in positive net outcomes from block 2 onward. The
reversal learning effect is consistently found around block 3.
These results are line with Bechara’s (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara,
2007) assumption that after 50 selections participants tend to
choose the long-term attractive decks. In the later blocks of IGT,
older adults decide in some extent toward less risky choices,
suggesting that older adults do not remain unconditionally under
uncertainty. In turn, the selection strategies seem to be guided
in some way by explicit rules acquired in the course of the
task.
From our findings, we propose that decision-making on
IGT and aging moves toward uncertainty—where the outcomes
are unknown—to risk—where the outcomes were learned and
may be used to guide adaptive economic decisions. Differences
between younger and older groups found in previous studies may
be explained by in a great extent by age-related changes in brain
areas associated with cold EF and not, necessarily, with impaired
reversal learning.
Limitations
This meta-analysis has some limitations that must be taken into
account when interpreting the results. Despite the efforts to
include gray literature, publication bias was found in the current
systematic search, indicating a possible overestimation of the
results.
Correlation coefficients between blocks were further
imputed since the values means and standard deviations
of block net scores were not reported on the original
statistical analysis. Importantly, the sensitivity analysis did
not alter the overall findings of the meta-analysis. We strongly
recommend authors using the IGT in their research to report
correlation values between blocks, as well as all the variables
systematically identified in the literature thought to modulate
IGT performance.
In the current meta-analysis, the included studies were
too heterogeneous, but the moderators with satisfactory data
points were non-significant. Since the moderators explaining the
heterogeneity remain unknown, the use of the normative data
and the generalization of the findings may be compromised.
A detailed description of variables relevant to assess IGT
performance would allow to explore systematically not only the
variables accounting for the heterogeneity between-studies, but
also to explain the idiosyncrasies on performances evidenced by
Steingroever et al. (2013).
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Future Directions
Steingroever et al. (2013) proposed that the frequency of losses
is an important variable to explain performance on the IGT,
given that participants seem to prefer the decks with infrequent
losses. Our meta-analysis did not allow to test the trial-to-trial
behavior adjustment after losses and gains, again due to the lack
of available information. The analysis of gains and losses ratio
in function of decks selection is of high relevance to increased
caution after losses (Rolison et al., 2013, 2016). This would also
help to clarify the pattern of strategies of older adults that may be
associated with reduced total net scores.
The existing meta-analyses should also be extended to explore
the reversal learning effect in younger (children, adolescents, and
younger adults) and clinical populations. Although older adults
show a robust learning effect on the expected block, in light of a
previous meta-analysis (Mata et al., 2011) it would be important
to explore if the elderly need more trials to overcome the initial
uncertainty than younger adults. Since a reversal learning effect
is observed, we would expect that once under risk (i.e., when
the task contingencies were learned) an equivalent performance
would be achieved. However, the reversal learning effect may be
faster in younger groups, giving them an advantage to reach a
more positive total net outcome on the IGT.
Research focused on personality and the IGT also
has to be extended to older groups, as it is likely that
individual differences modulate age-related changes in IGT
performance.
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